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Abstract: This paper revisits Bangladesh’s ‘double paradox’— sustained macroeconomic 
growth despite the poor state of governance and a high level of corruption— by critically 
reviewing trends in governance and corruption indicators during 1990-2017 vis-à-vis other 
South Asian countries. In addition, we draw upon data from a purposefully designed survey of 
manufacturing firms to assess the state of economic governance in the export-oriented ready-
made garments (RMG) sector, the country’s main source of foreign exchange and driver of 
economic growth. Consistent with the country’s poor ranking in a host of indicators of 
investment climate and corruption perception, in-depth interviews of RMG factory owners 
confirm high cost of doing business in various forms. We also find no evidence of growth-
mediated improvements in indicators of governance. On the contrary, our review of print media 
reports also suggest a growing governance deficit in the country’s financial sector. We 
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for the country’s future growth as well 
as performance of the RMG sector.     
 
 
JEL Codes: D73; O16; O43 





The view that economic growth not only depends on investment and human capital but also 
requires conducive governance and institutional factors is well-recognized in the literaturei. 
However, Bangladesh’s recent economic performance challenges the view that good 
governance is a necessary condition for sustained economic growth. Corruption perception 
surveys consistently rank the country very poorly, behind most other South Asian countriesii. 
Recent public opinion polls on the corruption situation also confirm that citizens predominantly 
believe corruption and bribes to be restricting access to jobs, justice, healthcare, education and 
other public goodsiii (International Republican Institute 2017). Yet, Bangladesh has sustained 
a relatively high growth rate despite its dysfunctional governance structure and political 
system. In the past, a handful of South Asian countries have also grown without large-scale 
improvements in corruption rankingiv. Corruption was pervasive alongside rapid economic 
growth in development states such as Japan and South Korea implying that it is not necessary 
to root out corruption first to spur growth. The experience of other East Asian countries (e.g. 
China) suggest a reverse causality i.e. initial economic growth can occur despite bureaucratic 
corruption, which in turn can facilitate improvement in at least some aspects of governance at 
a later stage of economic developmentv. These experiences have reinforced the view that 
corruption and poor governance are not fundamental barriers to economic growth.  
 
In the above context, this study re-examines the link between economic growth and corruption 
using Bangladesh as a case study. We do so by drawing upon secondary cross-country data as 
well as Bangladesh-specific primary survey data and media content analysis. The main 
objective is to assess whether there is any evidence of growth-mediated improvements in 
various aspects of economic governance, particularly corruption. We first summarize 
Bangladesh’s recent growth performance and discuss trends in selected investment climate and 
corruption indicators vis.-a-vis. other regional competitors. A wide range of country-level 
subjective and objective indicators are used for this purpose. To complement this analysis, we 
present primary evidence on the cost of doing business in the country’s most industrialized 
districts based on 92 in-depth interviews conducted during 2011-2012. Our respondents are 
firm owners and/or managers in Bangladesh’s export-oriented ready-made garments (RMG) 
sector, the main engine of industrial growth of the economy. By investigating the country’s 
main export sector, we provide descriptive evidence on the growth-corruption relationship 
based on survey-based firm-level analysis of the incidence of bribes. Lastly, we analyse media 
reports on corruption and financial irregularities to validate the analysis of country-level and 
sector-specific corruption.    
 
The two key contributions of our study are to (i) add to the international debate on the effect 
of growth on corruption and (ii) present new evidence on the effects of corruption from a sector-
specific analysis. Combating corruption and improving governance is key to achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while the SDG target 16.5 is to “substantially reduce 
corruption and bribery in all their forms” by 2030. According to the United Nations’ 
introduction to SDG 16, corruption, bribery, tax evasion and related illicit financial flows 
deprive developing countries of around US$1.26 trillion per annumvi. Curbing corruption is, 
therefore, an end objective in itself — important regardless of its impact on growth.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes Bangladesh’s recent 
growth performance. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on corruption and economic 
performance emphasizing that we do not know enough on whether, and how, economic 
development should alleviate corruption. Section 4 reviews the trends in indicators such as 
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time required to start a business, cost to start a business, strength of governance structure index, 
ease of doing business index and corruption perception index in Bangladesh vis-a-vis other 
South Asian countries. Section 5 presents survey evidence from the RMG sector on the cost of 
doing business. Section 6 discusses the findings additionally drawing upon a media content 
analysis while section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Background: Bangladesh’s Growth Trends  
 
At the end of the Millennium Development Goals era, Bangladesh has outranked many other 
developing countries of a similar income level in poverty and human development statistics 
including its economically advanced neighbors such as India and Pakistan. Gender and health 
indicators improved significantly by the early 2000s and the trend was sustained in later years. 
The improvement was significantly higher compared to economies sharing similar levels of 
income. So striking has been this achievement that many have called it a “development 
surprise”vii. A collaborative development strategy involving various non-government 
organizations (NGOs) was instrumental to the social progress achieved through a combination 
of low-cost solutions, gender-targeted programs and social awareness campaigns. A vibrant 
NGO sector for social services delivery also helped Bangladesh to bypass the prevailing 
“governance deficit” in the public sector. Contextual factors such as high population density 
facilitated the easy adoption of low-cost solutions and the quick spread of good practices. 
Political commitments to social development also ensured policy continuity across various 
political regimesviii. The progress in human and social development during 1990s and 2000s 
produced a positive feedback effect on the economy, facilitating the country’s graduation into 
the lower middle-income category. This transition however primarily benefited from rising 
agricultural productivity, export of ready-made garments, and foreign remittances from 
migrant workers, which all combined to produce a “growth surprise”ix. 
 
The annual economic growth has averaged around more than 6% over the past decade and has 
surpassed that of Pakistan, even though the former started from a much lower position in 
economic, developmental and social indicators with an economy devastated by the Pakistani 
army during the war of independencex  and ‘emerging as an independent nation after a bloody 
liberation war with Pakistan in 1971, the new country lacked basic infrastructure and 
institution’xi. The industrial sector in Bangladesh (the erstwhile East Pakistan) accounted for 
6%-7% of its GDP while that in West Pakistan  accounted for over 20%xii. By 2016, industries 
contributed 28.77% of the GDP in Bangladesh while the figure for Pakistan, India and the 
South Asian average were 19.36%, 28.85% and 27.8% respectively. Recently, Bangladesh has 
surpassed Pakistan in terms of GDP per head in US dollars converted at the market exchange 
rates. In 2017 Bangladesh had $1,538 per head while Pakistan had about $1,470xiii.  In 2016 
GDP per capita (constant LCU) when converted into US$ of the exchange rate of June 30 of 
the same year the figures for Bangladesh and Pakistan appear to be 709.14 and 581.41 
respectively.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 plots data on GDP growth rates of the South Asian countries over 1990-2017. 
Bangladesh has been growing around the South Asian average in terms of GDP growth rate. 
Barring a few years, it has been consistently above other regional competitors such as Pakistan. 
Over 1990-2017, 1990-2003 and 2004-2017 Bangladesh’s average GDP growth rate was 
5.49%, 4.7% and 6.16% while Pakistan’s figures over the respective periods were 4.14%, 
3.86% and 4.45% and South Asian averages were 6.27%, 5.28%, 7.27%. In an earlier 
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assessment, the World Bank (2003) applauded the country’s GDP per capita growth rate of 3.3 
percent per year in the 1990s; it was three times faster than the average for low-income 
countries during the 1990s. But the World Bank report also observed that further progress 
needed improvement in governance and the corruption situation. Yet, Bangladesh grew at an 
even faster rate in the following years. A more recent assessment predicts that Bangladesh’s 
growth resilience is likely to continuexiv. 
 
One of the key drivers of Bangladesh’s resilient macroeconomic performance is the ‘explosive 
growth’ of the RMG sectorxv.  A unique institutional arrangement such as Export-processing 
Zones (EPZs) helped bypass governance deficits in the industrial sector in the early years. After 
2009, Bangladesh overtook India as the leading RMG exporter in South Asia (Figure 2). 
Despite political instability and deterioration of law and order, total exports during FY2011-13 
increased significantly and this has been primarily driven by the RMG  sector (Figure 2). The 
RMG industry now accounts for 75 percent of the country’s export earnings and 25 percent of 
GDPxvi. Moreover, it employs more than three million out of the 70 million workforce. Female 
employment in the sector has also positively impacted human developmentxvii, which, in turn, 
is likely to have strengthened the process of economic growth.   
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
The next section offers a brief review of the literature on the importance of good governance 
to better understand Bangladesh’s puzzling macroeconomic growth trends.  
 
3. Growth-Governance Nexus: Review of the literature 
 
Studies on the determinants of economic growth in Bangladesh have emphasized the 
importance of governance-related factors such as corruption. Ahluwalia and Mahmud (2004) 
and Devarajan (2005) cautioned that the country’s public service delivery system was corrupt 
and it would hinder industrial growth. According to Zafarullah and Siddiquee (2001), 
bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency is causing billions of dollars’ worth of loss in 
Bangladesh in terms of unrealized investment and income. Mahmud and Mahajan (2010) found 
strong evidence of growth being negatively affected by the adverse governance factors, viz. 
corrupt behaviour of government officials. Similar concerns were also shared by earlier studies. 
Mauro (1995, p.683) conjectured that “if Bangladesh were to improve the integrity and 
efficiency of its bureaucracy by a one-standard-deviation increase in the bureaucratic efficiency 
index, its yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a percentage point.” According to an 
estimate of the World Bank (2000b), per-capita income in Bangladesh could increase two-fold 
in absence of corruption. More recent estimates by the World Bank suggest that reducing 
corruption in Bangladesh to the level prevailing in Scandinavian countries could add 2.1 to 
2.9% to its annual per capita GDP growthxviii.  
 
The above concerns are supported by the available theoretical and empirical literature on the 
cross-country variation in economic growth which also suggests a strong positive causal effect 
running from better governance to higher per capita incomesxix. Some studies have examined 
the effect of the components of the composite governance indicator, World Governance 
Indicators (WGI), separately on economic growth and reach the same conclusionxx. Among 
other important studies, De Groot, Linders, Rietveld, and Subramanian (2004) found regulatory 
quality to have a positive effect on both trade and economic growth in democratic countries 
while Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, and Parker (2006) suggested a significant positive impact of 
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regulatory quality and government effectiveness (two components of WGI) on the GDP per 
capita in developing countries.  
 
Turning to research specific to the role of corruption, some studies specifically looked into the 
effect of bribes on economic growth and reported no evidence in favour of the ‘sand the wheel 
hypothesis’. For instance, Méon and Weill (2010) find evidence of ‘grease the wheel 
hypothesis’, which appears to be more prominent in countries with a weaker institutional 
framework or poor governance. But others (e.g. Freund, Hallward-Driemeier, and Rijkers, 
2015) rejected the ‘grease the wheel hypothesis’ and found a strong negative association 
between bribe demands and firm growth. More recent meta-analyses of the existing studies on 
corruption, however, confirm a negative impact on growthxxi. 
 
The extant literature also acknowledges a two-way relationship between growth and 
corruption. A sustained spell of economic growth can improve governance in the long-runxxii. 
Equally, it is possible that over time, countries may be growing out of corruption. Indeed, many 
East Asian developmental states experienced the “double paradox” of growth surge during a 
period of high levels of political corruptionxxiii. The process of economic growth over time 
reduced both the incentives for government officials to extract bribes and firms’ willingness to 
pay them. According to the 'life cycle' theory proposed in Ramirez (2014), the growth-
corruption nexus follows an inverse U-shaped path whereby corruption peaks at early stages 
of economic development and declines as countries industrialize.  However, research on the 
opposite causal relationship—the effect of economic growth on corruption—is limited (for a 
recent survey of the literature, look to the study mentioned belowxxiv). Moreover, the growth-
corruption nexus may differ depending on the type of corruption (e.g. petty corruption or small 
bribes that households have to pay to access public services; grand corruption such as large 
bribes to secure government procurement; in-kind bribes for elite politicians). 
 
The literature review in this section, therefore, raises three important questions: First, is the 
corruption scenario in Bangladesh improving despite the country’s poor rating in CPI? Second, 
is bribery also common in the country’s leading manufacturing sector? Third, are bribes in the 
RMG sector a case of ‘greasing the wheel’ or do they pose a major barrier in the form of the 
cost of doing business? We discuss these issues in the next section. We single out corruption 
because unlike other governance indicators, it is easy to quantify and can be verified 
independently without necessarily relying on perception data. Besides, we show that in contrast 
to the concensus on the negative effect of corruption on economic growth in the literature, 
disaggregate analysis of other governance indicators often produce inconclusive results.xxv  
 
4. Trends in corruption perception and the cost of doing business: Bangladesh vs South 
Asian countries 
 
Despite steady economic growth and graduation to the lower middle-income bracket, the 
country is ranked poorly in corruption perceptions surveys (Table 1). Compared to 2015, its 
rank improved slightly in Transparency International’s corruption perception Index (CPI) in 
2017 but slipped in 2018, leaving it ranked 13th from the bottom. As a matter of fact, despite 
favourable social indicators, it even ranked behind South Asian countries such as Bhutan, India, 
the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.xxvi This is also confirmed by the low rank in the 
WJP Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project 2018).xxvii  
 




Bangladesh’s ranking in corruption perception is consistent with recent trends in the indicators 
of investment climate such as time and the financial cost to start a new business (Table 2). The 
cost to start a business in Bangladesh is one of the highest in South Asia. While the cost has 
fallen sharply between 2005 and 2016, indicating some improvements in the governance 
situation, the rate of decline has been higher for other countries such as India. Moreover, the 
figures for Bangladesh still remain below the South Asian average in 2016. The number of 
days required to start a business in Bangladesh in 2016 was the second highest (19 days) in 
South Asia.    
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Trends in two other indicators, namely ‘ease of doing business’ and ‘strength of governance 
structure’ show a similar pattern. In terms of ‘ease of doing business’, Bangladesh ranks almost 
at the bottom in South Asia. Bangladesh is only 7 points above Afghanistan (Table 2). In all 
other South Asian countries, doing business is easier than in Bangladesh indicating that poor 
governance directly impacts on industrial performance.xxviii  
 
Bangladesh’s ranking in CPI is also partly shaped by the reality that corruption control has 
remained static in the last five years. Table 2 doesn’t capture the cost of doing business, which 
is perceived to be high. Apart from bribery-related added costs, irregularities in the financial 
sector are a major concern. During the last five years, political control of commercial banks 
has increased. In 2015, the central bank of Bangladesh provided $20 million to garments 
manufacturers and exporters under ‘Export Development Fund (EDF)’ scheme, much larger 
than past allocations. The Central Bank also cut the interest rate for 270 sick garment 
companies to 8% from 15%, and of 8%, the government paid 3% as a subsidy in 2011xxix. At 
the same time, several state-run Banks illegally lent large sums of money to little-known RMG 
and non-RMG companies on fake documents. The accumulated default bank loans stood at 
US$142.03b (BDT 111, 347 crores) as of April 2016, compared to US$50.74b (BDT 35,000 
crores) in early 2009xxx. Mutual Evaluation Report (MER) of APG concluded that governance 
failings and appointment of politically linked people to the boards of public banks breed 
corruption promoting money laundering, financial crime risks for loan default, frequent scams 
and poor recovery of stolen money, scam, fraud and embezzlementxxxi.  
 
5. Corruption and the cost of doing business: Survey evidence from the RMG sector  
 
The irregularities in the banking sector and the hidden cost of business financing aside, 
entrepreneurs in Bangladesh face significant costs to business in the form of bribes paid. The 
government has been dismissive of the country’s poor CPI rating as it is based on subjective 
assessment. Therefore, in this section, we review survey evidence of bribe-related corruption 
using objective data.  
 
The World Bank’s Bangladesh Enterprise Survey Unit collected data for the period 2008–2010 
by interviewing representative samples of the formal, non-agricultural, non-extractive, private 
sector firms, with a view to gathering information about what businesses and firms experience. 
The respondents of the Enterprise Survey are mainly the business owners and top managers. 
Based on the World Bank enterprise Survey data, the size of bribes in Bangladesh is below the 
average for South Asia (USD1946 vs. USD2148). 
 




How serious is the problem in Bangladesh’s leading export sector? Estimates of bribes based 
on WBES are conservative since the sample also doesn’t include sufficient numbers of RMG 
factories. Therefore, we conducted 92 in-depth interviews of firm owners and managers in 
Bangladesh’s RMG sector. RMG firms were selected through a combination of stratified and 
multi-stage clustered sampling methods.  
The main findings are presented in Table 3. First, 22.8% of the respondents reported bribes as 
the most important barrier, while 3.3% held extortion as the most important barrier. Second, 
49% named either bribes or extortion as a retarding factor, and the percentage of respondents 
which consider bribes as a retarding factor for firm growth is 49% as well. Third, businessmen 
offer bribes for their own benefit (e.g. to avoid tax or duty; under-invoicing an imported item 
and so on). Fourth, there are established norms regarding how much to be paid as bribes in 
import and export activities which are usually fixed by the customs officials.  Fifth, foreign 
companies also bribe government officials. To get a contract from the Bangladesh government 
to supply some machinery, a foreign company has to pay 2.8 million US dollars to each of the 
five concerned ministries. In other words, both foreign and local companies have accepted the 
‘custom’ of bribe payments.  
Through our survey, we were able to elicit from the firm owners and managers the following 
important information which is line with the World Bank Survey data but more detailed 
explicitly revealing the ground realities. To form an import/export oriented joint stock company 
government fees range from US$857 to US$1428.58 depending on how many departments are 
required to approve the registration/ license are  needed and the type of activities the company 
engages in. But our survey reveals that before starting the business one has to spend US$34,332 
on average, which is one of the highest figures in the world. The number of days taken by 
government offices for the following are: for trade license 26 days, for company registration 
95 days, board of investment registration 83 days, export import license 51 days, utilization 
permission 65 days, gas connection 161 days, electric connection 97 days, water line 36 days, 
telephone line 35 days, permission from the environment department 79 days, fire license 27 
days, bond license 53 days. In response to the indirect question about bribe payments ‘Many 
businessmen have informed us that they had to spend money outside that needed in formal 
procedures. How much do you think one belonging to your industry/sector and of the similar 
size as yours has to spend in this way in a year?’ on average the respondents estimate the 
amount to be US$23,330. In 2009-10 the amount of informal payments for the regular 
operation of the firms is US$14,808. 
 
For firms already in operation, the number of days taken to get things done with some 
government departments is as follows: 20 days to clear goods through customs; 9 days to get 
clear payments from the AG office; 17 days to obtain a tax certificate; 11 days to obtain a VAT 
certificate and 13 days to renew the fire license. Unsurprisingly, 92.39% of the firms expressed 
their dissatisfaction with the quality of four essential public services which are gas supply, 
electricity supply, water supply and telephone (Table 3).  
 
Bribes have been fairly systematic in exporting industries like garments. In both in-depth 
interviews and from the survey interviews the following information has been collected. Based 
on the sample average figures, bribery in this sector is systematic.  For exports, a firm has to 
spend 0.75% of its turn-over and for imports 0.4% of its turn-over on the services from a 
Clearing and Forwarding (CnF) agent. A typical firm exporting and/or importing goods in this 
sector has to pay on average US$ 20986.73 a year for the services provided by CnF agents. 
Customs officials used to be paid a bribe of between US$42.86 and US$57.14 for ‘utilization 
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permission’ while bribes paid to BGMEA officials for the same document ranged between 
US$2.86 and US$4.29.xxxii To avoid such complications in official procedures, sample firms 
spend a sizable amount on accounting firms and solicitors, on average spending US$18464.73 
a year (Table 3).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In sum, regardless of whether we look at the size and prevalence of unauthorized payments, 
bribes constitute a significant cost of business in Bangladesh’s main manufacturing sector. In 
the next section, we investigate whether corruption and economic mis-governance is a system-
wide problem or whether it is specific to the country’s manufacturing sector. We do so by 
reviewing media coverage on cases of financial sector scams and irregularities in the past 5 
years. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
At the initial stage of the RMG sector development, a wide range of subsidies and concessions 
combined with preferential access to foreign markets helped bypass the governance problems 
that held back industrial growth in other sectors.xxxiii As the country’s industrial structure 
becomes more complex through diversification to non-RMG exports, further expansion will 
critically depend on a more favourable investment climate. In this section we present evidence, 
based on media reports published in recent years, to document the extent of bribes, fund 
embezzlements and/or unofficial payments in the economy and the nature of governance 
challenges in the financial and non-financial sectors. This is then followed by a discussion of 
earlier results on the prevalence of bribery in the country’s RMG sector. 
 
Table 4 below summarizes key incidents of embezzlements of public funds, financial 
irregularities and illegal capital flight. Consistent with our survey findings on RMG firms, 
serious cases of bribery, as widely reported in the Bangladeshi media, are rampant in 
recruitment, transfer and promotion in public sector. Table 4 summarizes major cases reported 
by the largest English Daily in Bangladesh. The first panel reports bribes paid to government 
officials (in non-business context) while the third panel summarizes media reports on bribes 
paid to revenue and customs department officials alongside notable cases of tax and duty 
avoidance/evasion. The second panel summarizes major cases of illegal capital flight/money 
laundering covered in the media.  The estimates/figures are either based on TIB or official 
figures reported by government agencies.  
 
As seen from table 4 (panel (a)), the amount of bribes paid in the public sector for staff 
recruitments range between US$3,866 and US$5,154. Much larger bribes are required in the 
case of transfer of administrative officers (US$9,665 on average) and transfer/posting of 
doctors (between US$1,610 and US$1,933). The prevalence of bribes in industrial sectors 
coincide with an overall decline in financial governance standards in the country as is 
evidenced from media reports on high profile cases of illegal outflow and embezzlement of 
public funds (Table 4 (panel (c)). On average, illicit outflows eat away 1.1 percent of the 
country's gross domestic product each year, which is also equivalent to 12.7 percent of the 
country's total tax revenue.xxxiv Institutional corruption is also rampant in imports controls by 
government bodies such as National Board of Revenue (NBR) and customs officials. 
According to one estimate, Bangladesh is missing out over US$145.7 million in revenue a year 
as the PSI (pre-shipment inspection) firms are bribed to achieve under- or over-invoicing, false 
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inspection and certification of consignments. Exploitation of the privilege of duty-free imports, 
violation of bonded warehouse licencing rules and duty evasion is rampant in Bangladesh.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The evidence presented on financial mis-governance and irregularities including bribes in 
Tables 3 and 4 is perplexing. The country’s export-oriented RMG sector prospered during the 
1990s apparently rejecting the view that good governance is a necessary pre-condition for 
industrial growth. However, much of this manufacturing growth was driven by enclave-type 
arrangements that helped the export-oriented garment industry to bypass the governance 
constraints.  The resultant economic growth, driven by the country’s rapidly expanding RMG 
sector, did not lead to visible improvements in investment climate. Bangladesh has ranked 
consistently poorly in global assessment of governance and corruption ratings during 2000-
2015. The quality of public institutions also did not improve significantly by international 
standards. This implies the absence of a "virtuous circle" in the case of Bangladesh whereby 
higher incomes have not led to further improvements in governance. The causal effect did not 
run from per capita incomes to corruption either in case of Bangladesh.xxxv  
 
Another perspective that is relevant to the growth-corruption debate in the context of 
Bangladesh is the role of political institutions. Some studies report a nonlinear relationship—
at a low level of economic development, as they find, a growth in per capita income could 
increase corruption, but after a threshold level of income, an increase in income is seen to lower 
corruptionxxxvi. In case of Bangladesh, such non-linear effect is also absent. One causal channel 
for the effect of corruption on growth is the quality of democracy or the degree of freedom or 
civil rights of the citizensxxxvii.  Democracy helps reduce corruption and thus exerts a positive 
effect on growth. Yet, sustained economic growth in the country did not see improvement in 
democratic institutions. Although Bangladesh has enjoyed democratically elected governments 
since 1990, the corruption perception index did not show a significant fall over the past two 
decades. Only during 1996 to 2001 Bangladesh was ranked above the bottom quintile in some 
governance indicators as there was a perception in that period that democratic system seemed 
to be working with successive regime changes taking place through peaceful credible elections. 
Since then, Bangladesh’s governance rankings have been steadily deterioratingxxxviii. The 
institutions which are to maintain checks and balances in a democratic state have become 
heavily politicised. In that sense, the political state of Bangladesh is, in fact a “false 
democracy”. This contrasts with East Asian non-communist countries such as Singapore, that 
have sustained macroeconomic growth under the authoritarian rule while also curbing 
corruption and improving bureaucratic efficiencyxxxix. Corruption did subside as the 
Singaporean economy grew but this also coincided with significant anti-corruption efforts. 
Corruption in Bangladesh, on the other hand, has become degenerative and entrenched among 
party and government officials.  
 
How should we interpret the RMG-sector specific corruption? According to Ahmed et al (2014 
p. 262), ‘stable and predictable corruption is simply a fact of doing business in the industry’ 
which implies a systematic and ‘benign’ bribery system. But corrupt officials may influence 
the law-making body and make regulations with a view to extracting bribes in futurexl. In this 
context, bribery could be the consequence of the extensive state support to the RMG sector. 
Many of Bangladesh’s 300 parliamentarians directly own garment factories or have financial 
interests in the garments industry and have colluded with the state to suppress factory wagesxli. 
Part of the state money could be redistributed back to the bureaucrats as payments for 






Based on data collected from the country’s most prominent export-oriented industrial clusters 
through in-depth interviews of factory owners, we have presented fresh evidence on the high 
private cost of doing business in Bangladesh. Regardless of whether the actual impact of 
corruption is ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ on the Bangladesh economy, our study confirms that the 
perceived level and reported cases of corruption continue to be the norm. High-profile cases of 
embezzlement of public funds from state-owned institutions undermine business confidence, 
increase the cost of doing business and sustain the culture of bribe seeking by public officials.  
 
What are the main lessons from Bangladesh’s “double paradox” of rapid growth and rising 
corruption? In the past, macroeconomic growth benefited from the rapid expansion of the RMG 
sector which prospered through a combination of preferential market access and  FDI-led 
production  carried out in EPZs. However, moving forward, the country faces stiff regional 
competition to sustain its manufacturing exports. The Bangladesh economy also needs a higher 
growth rate to sustain its journey on the middle income path and to become a high income 
nation by 2040. This critically hinges on an investment-led strategy that focuses on productivity 
and innovation and is aided by efficient public institutions. Future growth of the country’s GDP 
will also depend on rapid expansion of its export oriented RMG sector. The importance of 
investment-focused and export-led policies have also been recognized in government policy 
documentsxlii.  However, policies are rarely implemented and, based on the evidence provided 
in this paper, there’s little indication of progress in economic governance and corruption 
control. Inability to fight bureaucratic corruption at all levels of the government, particularly 
in the industrial sector, will make further expansion harder as manufacturing industries shift to 
higher value added activities and technological upgrading. As noted by Myrdal (1968) in 
Santhanam Committee Report nearly five decades ago, the so-called ‘speed money’ may avoid 
delays for an individual but it increases red-tapism as part of the culture in the country, slowing 
down the whole economy in the end. In this connection, lowering the cost of doing business 
will not only facilitate rapid expansion of the private sector, it will also help meet the SDGs 
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Figure 1: GDP growth rate of South Asian countries, 1990-2017 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2017), World Bank. Note: GDP growth (annual %) refers to 
“annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency” on constant 2010 U.S. 
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Figure 2: Trends in Garment Export Volume from Bangladesh and Selected South Asian 
Countries, 1992-2016 (in USD millions) 
 
 
Data source: World Trade Organization, 2018, “Statistics database” (accessed 04 Oct 2018). 
Notes: (1) Afghanistan and Bhutan do not export RMG while no data is available on Maldives after 2005; so 
these 3 countries are excluded. (2) RMG export refers to clothing export under the category of merchandise 
trade as provided by World Trade Organization. (3) For country-specific comparison purpose, non-RMG export 
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Figure 3: Amount of bribes paid to government offices in South Asia in 2017 (US$) 
 
Data source: World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), World Bank, 2017. Notes: (a) Figures are 
country averages. (b) In WBES, data on bribes is collected based on responses to the question: ‘It is 
said that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials 
to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, 
what estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to 
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Table 1. Trends in Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in South Asian countries, 2007-2017  
AFG BGD IND PAK LKA MDV NPL BTN SA 






























































































































































































Source:  Corruption Perception Index (2017), Transparency International. Notes: (1) Figure in 
parenthesis is country rank.  (2) Transparency International started constructing CPI for different 
countries in different years; for South Asia, all the countries appear in CPI in 2007. That’s why, we 
have presented data on CPI from 2007.  
 
 
Table 2. Trends in selected investment climate indicators in South Asian countries, 2005-2016 
  AFG BGD IND PAK LKA MDV NPL BTN SA 
     A. Time required to start business (number of days) a 
2005 9 51.5 93 23 46 9 31 62 40.6 
2006 9 43.5 36 25 46 9 31 62 32.7 
2007 9 67.5 34 24 42 9 31 48 33.1 
2008 9 66.5 32 24 44 9 31 46 32.7 
2009 7 43.5 32 20 44 12 31 46 29.4 
2010 7 26.5 30 20 38 12 31 46 26.3 
2011 7 26.5 30 19 35 12 29 35 24.2 
2012 7 26.5 28 19 11 12 29 35 20.9 
2013 5 21.8 31.2 19 11 12 17 30 18.4 
2014 7 19.5 33.5 19 11 12 17 15 16.8 
2015 7 19.5 28 19 10 12 17 15 15.9 
2016 7 19.5 26 18 9 12 17 15 15.4 
   B.   Cost to start a business (% of income per capita) b 
22 
 
2005 75.2 56.1 62 25.6 50 14 69.9 16.9 46.2 
2006 67.4 52.1 78.4 22.8 43.7 14 78.5 14.1 46.4 
2007 84.6 46.2 74.6 15.3 19.7 13.4 73.9 8.8 42.1 
2008 59.5 25.5 70.1 13.7 47 11.5 60.2 7.2 36.8 
2009 30.2 28.6 66.1 16 41.9 10 53.6 6.8 31.7 
2010 26.7 21.2 50.5 17.8 33.9 9.4 46.6 6.1 26.5 
2011 25.8 19.5 42 17.7 30.1 8.9 37.4 6.1 23.4 
2012 22.5 19.6 43.1 16.1 26.6 6 33 6 21.6 
2013 14.4 18.8 41.2 15.9 26.1 6.2 34.6 4.8 20.3 
2014 15.1 16.8 16.2 14.6 20.7 6.2 32.2 4.2 15.8 
2015 19 13.9 14.3 13.9 18.7 4.9 28.4 4 14.6 
2016 19.9 13.8 13.8 12.4 12.2 5.2 26.1 3.8 13.4 
  C.    Strength of governance structure index (0-10.5) c 
2013 0.7 5 7.3 7.3 6 3.7 6.3 5 5.2 
2014 0.7 5 8 7.3 6 3.7 6.3 5 5.3 
2015 0.7 5 8 7.3 6 3.7 6.3 5 5.3 
2016 0.7 5 8 7.3 6 3.7 6.3 5 5.3 
  D.    Ease of doing business index (1=easiest to 185=most difficult) d 
2015 182 178 131 148 109 129 100 71 131 
2016 183 176 130 144 110 135 107 73 132.3 







 Table 3: Survey estimates of days taken to access government services and the size of bribes in 
the RMG sector 
i. Number of days taken by 
government offices in service 
delivery  
  
 Type of services No. of days taken 
 Gas connection 161 
 Electricity connection 97 
 Company registration 95 
 Registration with Board of Investment  83 
 Environment department 79 
 Utilization permission 65 
 Bond license 53 
 Import-Import license 51 
 Water line 36 
 Telephone line 35 
 Fire license 27 
 Trade license 26 
 Customs clearance 20 
 Tax certificate 17 
 Fire license renew 13 
 VAT certificate 11 
 Clearance from AG office 9 
ii. Amount of bribes paid     
 Purpose Bribes in US$ 
 
Formation of a company 34332 a 
 
Total informal pay 23330 a 
 
During operation 14808 a   
 
For export, per invoice 5.71b 
 
For import, per consignment 142.86b 
 
For CA/law firm 18464.73 b 
 
For Clearing and Forwarding Agent (CnF) 22422  b   
Source: Authors’ survey. Official fees required to form a company ranges between US$857 and US$1428.58. (a) 
refers to amount actually paid while (b) refers to the amount others are perceived to pay by other firms in the 




Table 4. Media content analysis of bribery, corruption and financial irregularities in 
Bangladesh  
Types of corruption/areas of corruption                           Amounts (US$)         Time period 
                                                                                                             
Panel (a): Bribes in government departments 
Recruitments of ad hoc doctors on average1  
Recruitments of 3rd and 4th class employees1  
Transfer of admin officers to the capital and adjacent districts1  
Transfer of doctors from remote areas to the capital1  
Transfer of doctors from remote areas to municipality areas or from 
one regional town to another1 



















Panel (b): Illegal capital flight/money laundering 
Amounts of money laundered (case-1)2  
Amounts of money laundered (case-2)3 
Amounts of money laundered (case-3)4 
Amounts of money laundered (case-4)5 
Amounts of money laundered (case-5)6 
Amounts of money laundered (case-6)7 
Total amount funnelled out on average per year8 
Bangladeshi citizens' deposits with various Swiss banks9 
Bangladeshi citizens' deposits with various Swiss banks10 
Bangladeshi citizens' deposits with various Swiss banks11 
Anecdote: Money laundering by a single bank13 
2.98 million  
0.14 million 
0.25 million  





















Panel (c): Bribery in NBR and Customs, tax and duty avoidance/evasion
 
As the PSI (pre-shipment inspection) companies allow under- or 
over-invoicing, false inspection and certification of consignments 
Bangladesh is missing out over14  
Loss of revenue by NBR due to under- or over- invoicing, false 
inspection and certification of consignments by importers and 
exporters amounted to15  
Anecdote1: One RMG firm shipped 297 apparel consignments 
abroad but did not bring back any proceeds from the exports. and 
thus has siphoned off about16  
Anecdote2: One PSI company certified an import consignment with 
price tags of $18,500 per vehicle while the actual price was 
$35,215. Thus, through under-invoicing it helped the importer 
evade tax of17 
Anecdote3: One company violated bonded warehouse licencing 

















(2008-) Per year 
 
 












(iv) financial irregularities   
The amount embezzled from public banks by six little known 
commercial entitiesi  
4.34 billion As of Aug 2012 
Default bank loans (cumulative value)ii  142.03 billion As of April 2016 
Default bank loans (cumulative value)iii  50.74 billion As of early 2009 
The amount embezzled from public banks by six little known 
commercial entities1  
4.34 billion As of Aug 2012 
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